In this paper it is shown that one's conception of intelligence and its development profoundly affects the formulation of educational objectives. A mechanistic conception of intelligence leads to the definition of objectives as a collection of fragmented ftcognitive skills" that have little to do with children's development of intelligence. A Piagetian conception, on the other hand, leads to attempts to develop children's intelligence as an organized whole. Intelligence is not something that we can educate separately by pasting it onto the child. It is rooted in the biological origins of a whole organism and develops as a highly interdependent whole. Our comprehension of reality, or the way in which we understand reality, precedes and largely determines how we react to it. Whatever specific objective we may define in education must, therefore, support and enhance qualities such as autonomy, so that intelligence can develop as a coherent, powerful whole. If we want this intelligence to develop into something powerful enough to overcome the natural human tendencies to see reality in terms of emotional needs and to accept easy ready--made answers, we must educate children to deal logically with reality itself. By compartmentalizing academic skills and separating them from the development of intelligence, schools too often produce passive students who wait to be told what to think next.
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The title of my address is inspired by the theme of this conference, "One Child
Indivisible." It el.ves me an opportunity to express my growing concern about recent trends in curriculum and evaluation toward dividing intelligence into parts to be educated and evaluated separately. These trends can be seen in fragmontary or co4srtmontalim7d definitions of cognitive objectives such as "Informationprocessing skills," which imply that inforraation processing can be taught separately from other cognitive skills. such a view now seems to be buttressed by the pseudoscientific respectability of psychometric tests which define so-called "competencies"
in criterion-referenced tests. I am very distressed by the halo put around these "competencies" by program evaluators who use them to show quantitatively how much children have learned.
I would like to show in this paper that one's conception of intelligence and its development profoundly affects the formulation of educational objectives. A mechanistic conception of intelligence lends to the definition of objectives as a collection of fragmented "cognitive skills" that have little to do with children's development of intelligence. A Piagetian conception, on the other hand, leads to attempts to develop children's intelligence as an organized whole.
Most people now recognize the futility of trying to stuff children's heads with BEST COPY AVAILABLE encyclopedic faots.
In turning from eontwq to process, however, somo educators came to view the .And r.ore and more like a machine. This view is especially clear in the recent preoccupation with the teaching of "cognitive skills" and "concepts."
The term "skill" is justifiable when it refers to motor skills, ouch as walking, penmanship, swimmirii, skiing, and typing which become more perfect with practice.
However, I object stronly to the implication that the nature of intellectual learning is no different from the learning of motor skills. Motor skills can be developed by repetition and practice, but intelligence simply cannot be developed in these ways.
Consider the following skills I found in one Head start list of educational objectives: 
Basic conceptual skills
Abstracting and mediating skills.
If objectives are conceptualized in terms of such separate skills, it is no wonuer that curriculum activities reflect the same fragmentation.
Closely related to the teaching of "cognitive skills" is the teaching of a collection of socalled coacepts such as the following:
Three, five, and ten The child is shown a picture of some toys and a couple of chairs, and is told, "here are some toys. Listen carefully. Show me the dog in the box and the doll on the chair." I fail completely to see the importance of being able to find in a picture the dog that is in the box and the doll that is on the chair. Let me discuss a classical Piagetian task to give an example of children's ability to read things from reality. The task I am referring to is known as "class inclusion." In this task, the child is given, for example, six blue Clocks and two yellow .ones as shown in Figure 1 . He is first asked, "What do we call these?" so
Insert Figure 1 about here that the examiner can proceed with whatever word came from the child's vocabulary. If he says, "blocks," he is asked to show all the blocks. The examiner then asks the child to show "all the blue blocks" and "n11 the yellow blocks." Only after awaking sure that the child understands the words "all the blocks," "all the blue blocks,"
and "all the yellow blocks" does the examiner ask the following question: "Are there more blue blocks or more blocks?" Five-year-olds typically answer, "More blue ones," whereupon the examiner asks, "Than what?" The 5-year-old's typical answer is "Than yellow ones." In other words, the question the examiner asks is "Are there more blue bloc;;; or more blocks?" but the question the child "hears" is "Are there more blue blocks or more yellow ones?"
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Children "hear" a question that is different from the question the adult asks ecause once they mentally cut the whole into two parts, the only thin:; they can think about is the two parts. For them, at that moment, tho whole (wee not exist any longer. They can th.olk about the whole, but not when they are thinking about the parts.
In order to compare the whole with a part, the child has to mentally do two opposite things at the same time--cut the whole into two parts and put the parts back toz-ether into a whole. This is precisely what young children cannot do. This inability to think simultaneously about the whole and a part explains why, when they are ask,:d, "Are there Tore clue blocks or more bloe&s?" the only "blocks" they can see while thinking about the blue ones are the yellow ones.
Note that the child has all the sensory information and all the lartuace he needs to answer this question correctly.
Yet the reality he sees is not the same reality that the adult sees.
We never see reality as it is "out there" in the external world. We Iclow it by assimilatinc; it to the intelligence that we bring to erwh sitnatien. Fiaget coined the term "logicization" to relax. 'this process of puttin. observable elements of the external world into relationships.. The blocks are all "out there" and can be observei both by children and adults. Yet, the logical relationships the child can construct by looking at the blocks are not the same logical relationships that the adult constructs.
I would like to discuss another famous task to illustrate what Fiaget means by the loricization of reality. The task is known as the conservation of wei.,;ht. When we show the 7-year-old child two clay balls of the wane size (0 C) ), roll on, of them into a sausago (0 c= ), and ask hi;.1 whether the ball has "the same amonnt"
as the t-ansage, he is likely to say that, of course, the two have the 4.1-A, amount.
BEST COPY AVAILABLE or take anythin!; away."
If you then ask th child whetner the two objects weigh the same, the 7-year-ol.i uiaLally nya that the ball is heavier than the sauswel kite t't to e!.ild has all the observable infatuation and all the lanum:e he needs to conclude that the two objects have the same weii;ht. In fact, he even told the exa:Iiner, just before saying tuat the ball is heavier, that nothing has been added or taken away.
To explain what 1'iaget means by the logicization of reality in this context, would like to diseuns a funiamental distinction he made between physical knowledge and loeico-mathe7;atical knowledge.
physical knowledge is knowledge of objects that are "out there" and observable in the external world. In the conservation of weirht tank, for example, the color of the clay is "out there" in the object and is observable.
The weight of the clay ball, too, is in the object and observable. Logico-matheratical knowledge, by contrast, consists of relationships created by the individual. The numerical relationehip "two," for example, is neither in this object (()) nor in this object (c ), and if the ineivithell could not put these objects into a relationship, the two would remain unrelated. While physical knowledge comes mainly from outside the individual, lo4co-mathematical knowledge is constructed by the individual from tne inside. Cther examples of relationships created the individual are "the same sire," "birt;or than," "longer than," and "heavier than." The relationship "heavier than" is neither in this object (0) nor in this object ( c=P). This is a creation by the individual who puts observable things into a relationship.
What is the relationship between physical knowledge and logico-mathematical knowlod:o? Thrvo elArnrterition of t1;L1 mIntionohip illuotrnto the indivinibility of intelligence. Tne first in the mutual dependence and inseparabilit4 of physical and logico-6athematical knowledge. ringet believes that phynical knowledge cannot exist wLthlut loc;ico-c.atitematical knowledge, and that the converse is also true. For BEST COPY AVAILABLE exasplo, when we think about the physical property of an object, such as the color of a pen which is red, we can think about this redness only by putting it into a relation- There would, likewise, be no logico-mathematical framework if there were no objects in the world for the child to put into relationships.
Jecohdly, the relationship between physical and logico-mathematical knowledze is characteriLed by circular causality, in which the development of one contributes to they development of the other, and this development, in turn, contributes back .o the first, .id so forth in a continuous way fro.:: birth to adulthood. In other words, the better an individual can structure logico-mathematical relationships, the better he can read from. reality whatever is observable.
Thirdly, knowledge begins in infancy mainly as physical knowledge, and the role of logico-mathec.iatical knowledge becomes increasingly greater as the child bec=es capaA.e of concrete and foncal operations. Babies and very young children spend moat of their waking; hours acting on objects to find out their physical properties. They examine everything in sight by turning them over, putting them in their mouths. sveezing them, dropping them, and so on, to find out about their properties. To put thin development in anthropomorphic tonna, logico-matomatical knowledge has a "tough row to hoe" because it comes into existence later than physical, i.e., empirical, knowledge, and has to subjugate it by logicising it.
Let us return to the time lag between the conservation of amount of clay and
BiST COPY MUM the conservation of weight to illustrate tIto difficulty the child ha3 in ogiciving his physical, empirical knowledge. The size of the clay is visible, and terefore amount is easier to put into a logical relationehip than weight. Since weight is invisible, the only way the child can observe it is by holding it and feeling its weight. Allen the 7-year-old compares the weight of the clay ball with that of the sausage, he usually compares the INressura exerted at the one point of contact between t1 ball and the table with the pressure that is distributed all the way along the bottom of the sausage. He thus confuses the yskat of the object with the limnat he would feel if the table were hi3 hand. This is why he says that the ball is heavier than they sausage, .even though he knows that nothing has been added or taken away. Since weight is much harder to logicize than amount, the child can think of amount of clay in logico-mathematical terms, but he continues to think about the weight of clay in physical terms. In other words, the 7-year-old'a logicomathematical framework is powerful enough to logicize visible amounts, but not powerful enough to logicize the invisible weight. Even adults can be found in situations where thei. logic is not powerful enough to be rational, especiairPtihen emotions and social pressures are involved. Politicians are particularly good at using emotional appeals to influence our evaluation of facts and sway our opinions.
So far, I have been talking about children's ideas about very intellectual things, such as class inclusion and the conservation of weight. What about more mundane thin4s such as children's notions of "sisters," "mothers," and "grandmothers"?
In the following exerpt from The Child's Conception of Time, Piaget (1946) was interviewing a four-and-a-half-year-old who had a younger sister. tie asked:
Who is the older of you two'? Me. Why? Because I'm the birder one.
Who will be older when she start3 going to school? Don't know. When you are grown up, will one of you be older than the other? . . . Don't know.
Io your mother elder than ,u? Yev. In your Granny older than your mother?
No.
Are tht the same age? I think so. Iun't she older than your .,other`' Note that there was a consistently good empirical reason for everything this child said.
She oelieved that her grandmother was no older than her mother because the two were the same size. She also believed that neither was growing older because the; ouch not become bigger. The child indeed had some Lotion of time. but it was all related to observable phenomena. Her time was not structured to the point of beint: a deductive system. Thus, the child could not deduce that the interval between her age and her sister's age would always remain the same. This iu an example of how "si4le" concepts like "sitter," "mother," and "grandmother" are in fact extremely co...plex because they depend on children's structuring of logical, deductive systems. The intelligence that constructs all these interdependent notions is siply not a collection of separate cognitive fragments.
I have attempted so far to argue that intelligence is a highly interrelated network of concepts and relationships which develops as an indivisible whole. This development takes Mace not only indivisibly but also inseparably from the child's social and moral development because the child uses the same.intelligonce in making A little boy (or a little girl) goes for a walk in the street and meets a dog who frightens him very much. So than he goes home and tells his -lother he has seen a dor that was as big as a cow (p. 148).
The secona story was:
A child comos home from school and tells ills mother that the teacher hld given him good marks, but it was not true; tse teacher had given him no marks at all, either 600(i or bad. Then his mother was very pleased and rewarded him (p. 148).
Six-year-olds tended to sdY that it is worse to say, "I saw a dog as 'Die-7 as a cow."
Why? 13ecause dogs are never as big as cows, and mothers do not believe such statements:
In other words, for 6-year-olds, the more the lle deviates from what is plausible, the less believable it is, and the worse it is, because the grerter the likelihood of puniLshment. Older children, in contrast, invoke the same empirical facts to support the opposite opinion. For them, the more believable the lie is, the worse it is because other people believe it. 'Given Nxactly the came external reality, young children mai different "facto" from reality. BEST COPY AVAILABLE If you aro saying: to yourself that young children say the cute things they say only i,ecause they have not had all the "experience" of an adult, I would like to mention the attempts to cover up the Watergate affair. This is an example of how acts of intelligence are determined largely by how people understand a situation.
Haviar road reality in a certain way, Mr. Nixon and his associates adapted to their reality as they understood their reality. These are highly intelligent people who were intelliizent enough to get through law school and rise to power and wealth.
Yet, their desires, ambitions, and social relationships reduced their ability to read reality to the point of lying in ways that were scarcely less transparent than the lies of 4 -year -olds.
If intelligence develops as an indivisible whole, and this development is inseparable fro» social and moral development, the objectives of early childhood education must be fomulated in tenos of development, ja, a whole. This formulation is in contrast with lists of specilic objectives, such as the ability to show "the dog in the box and the doll on the chair." It is also in sharp1 contrast with the objective of "success in school." "SuccesS in school" and "intellectual and moral development for adaptation to the reality of adult life" are not mutually exclusive, but they overlap only partially as can be seen in the intersection of the two circles in Figure 2 .
Insert Figure 2 about here The part of "success in school" which uoeo not overlap with "development" includes all the thins we memorized just to succeed in school. do can all remember memorizing lots of irrelevant words we did not understand or care about, just to pass one test after another. To quote Piaget (1972) , "iiverybody BEST COPY AVAILABLE known how little mains of the knowledge Required in school, five, ten, or twenty years after tW end of secondary schools (p. 86)." This problem continues to be a ver;, oQvious one, especially for compensatory education procrams such as Head Start and Follow Through, whose perspective is limited to short-term adaptation to traditional schools.
The part of "development" in Figure 2 which does not overlap with "success in school" refers to the social, moral, and' intellectual development which takes place outside the school or, sometimes, in spite of schools.
It is sad to note that forma operations and a high level of moral development are not always found among university students. Piaget (1972, p. 51) observes that when we look at normal adults , we are forced to conclude that people wht-we masters of their reason are as rare as people who are truly moral.
If we take intellectual,.social, and moral development as our long-range goal (the circle on the left in Figure 2) ; how can we define short-range objectives for early childhood education? Many of you have already heard me objecting to my earlier juxtaposed conceptualization that circulated most widely in the Hanlbook on Formntive and Sum native Evaluation (Kamii, 1971) . In that book I delineated educational objectives by juxtaposing socio-emotional and cognitive objectives as subsequently found out that, in the psychological reality of the child, classification, BEST COPY AVAILABLE seriation, nu.;:ber, physical knowledge, etc., a'e related not in this neat, mutually excLulive wa as shown in this itemized list, but, rather, in the messy, inseparable This list may seem to some like a set of arbitrary values pulled out of what Kohlberg and nayer (1972) since it develops by the child's own creation and coordination of relationships.
Toeico-nathematical objectives are, therefore, better formulated in terms of encouraginG the child's alertness than in terms of developing his "skills" such as "classification skills." The following example illustrates this point. A croup of 4-year-olds went on a walk one day when there were many puddles on the Ground. The teacher cautiened the children by saying, "Anyone who steps in a puddle is a wet noodle." The next day was very cold, and the puddles were half frozen. When the groupwent outside again, one of the children said, "Anyone who steps in the ice is a frozen noodle!" This remark was typical of this alert child, who came up with similar statements all the time. Alert children thus think of relationships that do not even occur to adults. The child's alertness is, therefore, a richer, more fruitful objective than a list of preconceived "skills." While structuring the observable data in his reality, this child was perfecting his classificatory scheme of "a puddle is to an icy puddle, what a wet noodle is to a frozen noodle."*
In conclusion, I would like to refer back to the examples given earlier of class *Those who are interested in an explanation of the rest of the objectives listed above are referred to Kamii and DeVries (in press ).
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